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There’s been a misunderstanding about the purpose of the Coroner’s Inquiry and its resulting verdict since it occurred in January of 1908. Many seem to think it was a civil or criminal trial attempting to determine or exonerate blame. Possibly because a jury was involved or because it was held in a proper courtroom with the gallery open to the public, or because it was overseen by a Justice of the Peace who overheard sworn witness testimonies. Maybe it’s because big public coroner’s inquiries just aren’t that common as they used to be, particularly here in the U.S. Probably all of the above.

Though inquiries use a lot of the same legal structure and terminology which are fundamental to civil/criminal trials, they are distinctively different types of formal hearings with different goals. Luckily, very little has changed about how and why these inquests are conducted, other than their frequency.

A Coroner’s Inquiry is a public hearing of evidence which happens when a death (or the deaths of many) seems violent, mysterious, or unnatural somehow. Unlike a criminal or civil trial – which those of the United States will be more familiar with today – a Coroner’s Inquiry is not held to determine if there is any legal liability to be held by anyone. It has just one purpose: attempt to determine who died, where & when the death occurred, and what was the means by which they died. More often than not, this is done to collect evidence and knowledge which can be used to prevent similar deaths in the future.

In the case of the Monongah Mine Disaster, the elected County Coroner was a man by the name of E.S. Amos who had personally organized, set up and ran the makeshift morgue in Monongah within the first 15 or so hours after the disaster and laid out the protocol for how bodies would be managed, documented, and treated as they came through the morgue over the next several weeks. Amos is the one who would establish and uphold what is known as the “official number” of dead for Monongah – the number of deceased individuals which came through the coroner’s morgue in association with the mine disaster.

Coroner Amos, whose surname is biblically associated with the concept of ‘speaking with God’s righteous justice against the disparities of the rich and the poor’, also happened to be the elected “Justice of the Peace” in 1907 and was a known political associate of A.B Fleming. This is likely what fueled the suspicion and confusion of Amos and his role in this hearing then and still does to this day. However, thoroughly reading through the transcript of this lengthy inquiry clearly shows that when it came to this case and its resulting verdict, his duties sat first and solely as the Coroner – an elected steward of death – who handled almost all of these victims himself over the course of several weeks, not as a representative of some form of “righteous” Justice aiming to bring peace.

Comprehending the verdict of the Jury at the Coroner’s Inquiry

The majority of these inquests require only the coroner and their singular verdict. However, any mysterious/unnatural/violent deaths in the workplace in the State not only required a Coroner’s Inquiry in 1907 but they also required a jury, consisting of 6 “disinterested” local men in this case, to tackle large calamities like mining disasters.

Again, the jury’s duty in this inquest was not for the purpose of assigning blame or placing liability on any entity for the deaths of the miners at Monongah. They were there to collect the evidence as it was presented, to analyze and summarize it, and come to at least a two-thirds majority agreement on a “most likely case” scenario then use said scenario as a basis to recommend any changes in general work practices or existing laws which could aid in preventing other such loss of life in the future.

Now, recalling that the jury is there to answer these basic questions:

• Who died?
• Where did they die?
• When did they die?
• What was the primary means/cause of death?

let’s review their verdict. Here are the portions which matter most, in full:

The jurors sworn to inquire when, how and by what means the said A. H. Morris, Charlie McCane, John M. McGraw and about three hundred and fifty other persons came to their death, upon their oaths do say that we find from the evidence in our possession that A. H. Morris, Charlie McCane, John M. McGraw and about three hundred and fifty (350) others, whose names are made a part of the record herein, came to their death on the 6th day of December, 1907, by means of an explosion in Monongah Mines numbered six and eight owned or operated by the Fairmont Coal Company, which was caused by either what is commonly known as a blown-out shot, or by the igniting and explosion of powder in Mine Number Eight. As to which caused the initial explosion, the evidence and opinion of mine experts, and other witnesses, was conflicting.

We further find from the evidence that the traces of gas in these mines were slight, and not considered dangerous, and dust which was created was removed or kept watered down as far as was deemed practicable, and that in operating these mines the Company complied with the mining laws of the State. (Report of Hearings… – pg 489 – 490)

Let’s simplify that first part a bit: “The jurors sworn to inquire when, how and by what means the said…persons came to their death…do say that we find from the evidence in our possession…came to their death on the 6th day of December, 1907, by means of an explosion in Monongah mines numbered six and eight…”. That’s it. Really, that’s the formal “verdict” as those are the factual answers to those 4 fundamental questions the jury was required to formally answer.

Additionally, in these major workplace related disasters, the jury had a duty to theorize as best as they could any and all potential, possible, or probable scenarios which could have occurred and to offer recommendations on how they could possibly be prevented in the future. To do so, the jurors have chosen to present the causes, conditions, and factors which had the highest tally of consensus among the sworn witnesses while still including that these witnesses did not come to any formal conclusions, only several sound theories. Therefore, the rest is all chosen and presented as justified speculation for the purpose of theorizing various ways to potentially prevent such losses again in the future.

Their choice to include their further findings from the evidence reflects that the majority of the witnesses conceded to these things as well. It’s not a statement which exonerates the company, the miners, or the conditions of the mines. It’s acknowledgement that, in spite of all these things which were done properly and to the extent of their knowledge, this event was still able to occur and cause such devastating loss of life.

For more:

• LegalClarity – What is a Coroner’s Inquiry?
• E.S. Amos – WikiTree; Find A Grave
• Report of Hearings before the Joint Select Committee of the Legislature of West Virginia – Verdict of the Jury and Recommendations, pg 489 – 490
• Fairmont West Virginian, Dec. 7, 1907, page 1
• Aretas Brooks Fleming – e-WV
• Amos – the Prophet – Wikipedia

© 2026 Katie Orwig. All Rights Reserved.

Yes.

The two mines were connected along one heading. In mine #6 this heading was called “F face”. The #8 mine had a collection of names for its side of this same heading: “No. 8 North Heading”, “2nd North Heading”, and/or “2nd Right Heading”.

Inspector LaRue describes in a report about the disaster to the mine department that the two mines are “connected near their centers by three small openings, each covering the area of 70 feet”, along a singular heading.

L.E. Trader, fire boss for #6, describes in his testimony how two of these openings were fitted out. In the “entry farthest from the river” (highlighted in light blue and marked “1” in the image above), a wooden stopping was placed about 15′ beyond 4th right on F face to close the connection.

In the entry closest to the river (highlighted in light green and marked “3”), was a thick wooden door which opened towards #6 at the time of the disaster. Unlike the center entry which he could not describe, Trader had been through this doorway entry on F face and could confirm that it had at one point been blocked by a pair of double iron gates which men could still move through & past. But Trader said that once the thick doors were put in place, the iron gates were removed and the doors remained, “locked with a chain—locked on No. 8 side and on our side. The chain passed through a hole about a foot from the edge of the door—two feet long.”

In these connecting headings there were doors so that each mine was separately ventilated at the time of the accident, the object of connecting them being the ability to ventilate each mine from either opening in case of necessity. It has been shown that this was entirely practicable as this method of ventilation has been carried on at various times when either of the fans was undergoing repairs, and was the temporary method used during the going repairs, and was the temporary method used during the investigation following the explosion owing to the destruction of one of the fans… – Mines and Minerals Vol. 28, pg 278

Was this illegal or irresponsible at the time?

No.

Connected mines were legal and strictly regulated by the mine department to the point that the mine department could even order a company to connect to another mine or face penalty. Several mines around the state were in the process of connecting to other existing mines when disaster fell upon them earlier in the year.

There were several reasons why two mines, particularly those known to be gaseous (which #6 & #8 were not), would want to be or were required to be connected underground. The first critical reason was a mining method called “Double (Triple) Entry”. This method had been made formal law in West Virginia some years prior to the disaster as it permitted more ventilation through the mines and required at least 2 entry points for workers to get in and out of a mine. This is certainly why when C.W. Watson was questioned right after the disaster about the reason for having the mines connected, he simply replied to the reporters that it was “for the purpose of giving more openings.”

Connected workings underground also made large machine repairs more efficient and could be used in emergencies as an added “escape route” for workers in the deepest parts of the mines. This is quite likely why #8 mine boss, John McGraw, was found several days after the disaster deceased on the #6 side just beyond this connection. His remains were able to be identified by friends as well as by the contents of his pockets indicating that he likely survived the initial blasts and was trying to escape into #6 mine when the damps eventually overtook him.

For mines over a certain size, or shaft mines which require miners to take them underground, or the mines formally classified as “highly gaseous” connection to another mine to provide extra ventilation and access for workers was the standard method long before 1907.

For more:

• Mines and Minerals, Vol. 28
• Report of Hearings before the Joint Select Committee of the Legislature of West Virginia
  • LaRue’s Testimony – pg 473 – 482
  • Lester Trader’s Testimony – pg 309 – 319
• Library of Congress – Chronicling America – Newspaper Archives
  • Clarksburg Daily Telegram – C.W. Watson
  • Fairmont West Virginian – John McGraw

© 2026 Katie Orwig. All Rights Reserved.

The two mines were *connected* along one heading, yes. But shared ventilation? As in: one fan and one big open continuous system for both mines?

No.

Mine #6 was the elder mine, opening in October of 1899. It had its own ventilation system and an 8′ x 11′ Capell fan for years before #8 came along.

Mine #8 had an independent system from its start in 1904 along with a much larger 22′ x 8′ Ripley fan.

Both mines had designated airways for ventilation of “bad air” as well as “good air” ventilation for the working areas and haul ways. The two systems were connected along one heading for several practical reasons, including the ability to be “shared” should it become necessary. This heading was called “F Face” in #6 mine and “No. 8 North Face” in #8 mine.

Evidence for these separate systems has always been in plain sight in contemporary photos and reports. But perhaps like some of the first outside reporters on the scene back in 1907, most are just not familiar with these types of workings in this type of place and get a little confused by what they see or read.

Perfectly understandable. Let’s try to remedy that by getting everybody a little more oriented.

#6 Mine

Below is a “bird’s eye” ground plan of #6 mine entry in 1907. You can see the #6 fan house to the left of the portal and trestle. It is connected to the dedicated airways which take “good air” in for the workers as well as vent out the “bad air” from the workings.

Below is a picture taken likely within the first 48 hours of the disaster. Using the ground plan above, locate the green arrow indicating the location of #6 portal. If you were standing around the tip of that green arrow and looked in the direction which the arrow points, the image below is what you would have seen in 1907.

Let’s try that again, but from another perspective. Using the same map above, locate the orange arrow indicating #6 trestle. If you were standing at the tip of that orange arrow on that section of the #6 trestle and looked towards the #6 portal, the image below is what you would have seen within a few hours after the disaster in 1907.

Practically no damage was done to the entrance of No. 6 mine, and there is very little evidence on the surface to indicate an underground disaster. The top of the air-shaft to which the No. 6 fan was connected
was blown in the air, but no damage was done to the fan or engine. Thirty-four minutes after the explosion, this door had been repaired and fan was in regular operation. – Mines and Minerals, Vol. 28, pg 279

#8 Mine

Below is another “bird’s eye” ground plan, this time of #8 mine entry. Unfortunately, most every available copy of a ground plan for this mine has the location of the fan and boiler houses either covered or missing due to low quality copies. This map is from Mines and Minerals Vol. 28 and though it is a ground plan from around a year prior to the disaster, it is the only one which does not cover the location of the fan and boiler houses with the title “No. 8 Mine”.

Just like we did above with #6, locate the red arrow that indicates the #8 Fan & Boiler Houses on the map of #8 above. If you were standing at the tip of that red arrow, looking in the direction which the arrow points, the image below is what you would have seen a few hours after the disaster in 1907. Note the missing fan plates on the top left side of #8 fan.

One last time, here is another perspective. On the map above, locate the orange arrow which indicates the #8 trestle and the green arrow pointing at the #8 portal. If you were standing on the #8 trestle near the tip of the orange arrow and looked in the direction of the #8 portal, this “enhanced” wide shot from Mines and Minerals Vol. 28 is the overwhelming view you would have had that day.

The No. 8 slope and manway were completely wrecked at the mouth…The 22’x8′ steel fan with steel casings and concrete roof was completely wrecked…Part of one of the fan plates was blown across the river.” – Mines and Minerals, Vol. 28, pg 278-279

Hopefully you are a little more mentally and visually familiar with 2 separate mines now. And that they very clearly each had their own independent fans and ventilation systems from the start which were more than adequate for the spaces they served.

For More:

• Mines and Minerals, Vol. 28
  • Underground map of #8 mine around 1906 – pg 276
  • Underground map of #6 mine around 1906 – pg 275
• WVU West Virginia & Regional History Center – Photographs

© 2026 Katie Orwig. All Rights Reserved.