An educational collection of ongoing research and resources on the Monongah Mine Disaster of 1907.
Author: kto680
I grew up in Monongah, WV and received my BA from Bethany College in WV and spent the next several years working the professional theatre scene in Detroit, MI as a scenic designer, painter, carpenter, and TD. In recent years, I have shifted my location to Indianapolis and my area of focus to end-of-life and death care.
Monongah mines did NOT use any kind of live animal to test for gas.
Monongah used Wolf Safety Lamps which were designed by M. Charles Wolf in 1883 in Saxon, Germany and were available to the United States by the 1890s, long before mines #6 & #8 were opened.
Wolf Safety lamp outside No. 6 mine during recovery efforts.
Wolf would not develop an electric lamp until 1907.
Due to the unfortunate and infamous history of live birds being brought into mines to asphyxiate on behalf of the miners, the canary and other small birds would be a universal symbol for warnings about a gassy or gaseous environment. By the time of the Monongah disaster the only canaries in the mines were chalk drawings made by trapper boys on the doors, walls, and timbers of the mines. No matter what language one spoke or read, the visual language of a tiny bird upright and a tiny bird keeled over was all the literacy one needed.
It’s important to know that when canaries were in use miners did not just let the birds die. The moment the bird showed signs of distress they would quickly rush it back to fresh air to revive it. Until the late 1800s, the birds were not just life-saving tools, they were companions to the miners which were appreciated and cared for because they were lifesavers.
The use of canaries formally began in the UK, much like the manufacturing and distributions of the Wolf Safety Lamp. Watch the video below to learn more about the lamps, their history, and to learn some other…uh…”means” that were used for testing or removing gases from the mines.
Again, a complex question with many complicated answers.
Okay, this requires a bit of a vocab lesson with a special focus on how they used certain terms back then versus now. Mostly because, I think if we address it this way, I can help you comprehend some of these terms and their context a bit better without having to bring a lot of numbers and percentages into the mix too.
A lot of the same terms are still in use; we just use a few of them a bit differently now. If you are doing active research on this event, these terms are going to be critical literacy for you and your search engines.
So, the 2 most important terms to comprehend first are “gassy” versus “gaseous”.
“Gaseous” was/is used to describe a constant and consistent presence of a certain high quantity of flammable/combustible/noxious gases posing imminent threat or danger.
“Gassy” was/is used to describe the occasional or constant natural presence of flammable/noxious gases in smaller, random quantities which are typically of little to no threat. These small, non-threatening amounts when discovered were referred to as “trace” amounts of gas.
There was also a classification called “non-gaseous” at the time. This could describe a mine that had never so much as detected even trace gas in its workings to a moderately “gassy” mine. As you can likely determine on your own, that term left way too much free space for interpretation. However, it is worth noting that they knew at any moment an undetected pocket, or “bleeder”, could occur so, good ventilation and constant mindfulness was considered “Common Sense” by bosses and owners, even in “non-gaseous” mines.
In 1907, these two words were used distinctively and only advanced miners in specific jobs were thoroughly trained in them. General miners of then were not educated in these gases or what levels made their spaces merely “gassy” or dangerously “gaseous”. Nor were they trained in detecting and measuring these gases to the extent that general miners are now. They were expected to learn on the job and were mostly just taught how to use safety lamps to check for a sudden release of gases before and after shooting down coal in their general area.
Today, these two terms are still used to describe certain levels of gas that are naturally present, with “gaseous” still implying that the levels present are a dangerous or imminent threat. However, “gassy” no longer implies that the amount or type of gases present hold little to no threat, just that they are *not yet* to the threshold of becoming a threat and won’t/shouldn’t become a threat if they are monitored and controlled immediately.
This is where specific vocabulary comes up again, particularly on what miners generally called “bad air”. If you are not already familiar with the different mixes of marsh gases, the “damps” are very plainly explained in page 2 of this post.
For a mine to be classified as “gaseous” as opposed to just “gassy” in West Virginia in 1907, the type of gaseous mixture presented and being measured mattered just as much as the amounts consistently present.
This is the part of the answer where things could get very complicated – lots of physics, chemistry, percentages and all that. Regurgitating numbers and formulas won’t necessarily help with comprehending how inspectors reasoned and came to the conclusions the way they did in 1907, so let’s stick with the narrative-style explanation.
Though, a reminder, I am simplifying this portion for fundamental literacy purposes. Surveying properly for gases in underground workings was/is an advanced and skilled process which involves a lot of conditional factors and variables. We are going for very, very basic comprehension here, nothing too advanced.
Quite simply, if there is coal, then there is water and there is gas. If you are lucky, such as mines #6 & #8 were known to be up to this point, water will be your biggest contender underground and gas but a simple nuisance.
So, the question in 1907 was not *if* there is gas present in a coal mine but rather, very simply:
How many cubic feet of dangerous gases is released per ton of coal mined which is then vented through & out of the mine? (This is gas that is, basically, getting forcibly released by the larger mining process and will, therefore, emit and accumulate within the workings in greater quantities and volumes. This man-made release is often referred to specifically as “Coal Mine Methane”.)
AND
How long & often and what type of gases are naturally released and present in the air of the mine workings? (This is more about measuring the residual gas that naturally emits and accumulates from the unmined coal which makes up the infrastructure of the workings more than anything else. This natural release is often referred to specifically as “Coalbed Methane”.)
How much ofwhatyou found, when and how you found it was pretty much a “crapshoot”. Yeah, they had surveying tools and certain technological means to extract gas & water which were advanced for their time, but they were still quite rudimentary in comparison to the standards we would or should expect since.
Today, miners are trained and educated on these conditions in advance. Miners are now taught that all mines are to be considered “inherently gassy”, always holding the potential of elevating to “gaseous” at any moment, as a matter of over-precaution; a mindful nod to the Union motto of “Safety First”. In 1907, the general miners who were working most directly with these gases were left vulnerable to their naivete as general mining work was considered the “entry-level” job of its time, equivalent to the jobs which we still expect to be exclusively filled by inexperienced teenagers & young adults today, btw.
So, in review:
The mere presence of marsh gases in a mine is natural and does not make a mine “gaseous”. Not then, not even now.
There’s “gassy” and “gaseous“. “Gassy” is natural, often implying there are small “trace” amounts of gases which are little to no threat if managed quickly and appropriately. “Gaseous” is natural too, but now there are large dangerous amounts of gases in the workings posing an imminent threat.
How and why your mine was classified as “gaseous” in 1907 had to do with the type of “damps” the mine naturally emitted, how much was released per ton of coal mined, and to what extent these gases lingered in the air and were vented through the workings.
Talk about a single complex question that has a lot of complicated answers. But it is one of the most important ones to get as correct as possible. So, let’s begin with the shortest and simplest answer, if that is all you are here to get:
No.
They did not need to be classified as “gaseous” by the knowledge and standards of 1907 or any year prior. Though the local Fairmont district was considered to be one of the more generally “gaseous” areas of the broader Pittsburgh Seam, mines #6 & #8 in Monongah were, surprisingly, not “gaseous”.
Deputy Mine Inspector LaRue and several others who had plenty of personal background in “gaseous” mines, locally and around the country at the time, testify and confirm that #6 & #8, “produced some gas, but they were not dangerously gaseous.”
So, by their own words & knowledge of their time, the mere presence of gas does not imply or classify a mine as “gaseous”. That still holds true today.
Yeah, it could happen from time to time, place to place with underground work. You’ve gotten lucky with *this* spot. So far.
Several did, in fact, and several testified about it in January of 1908 too. Let’s talk about some of them because, yeah, I know what the Historical Marker in town says. I was born & raised there, remember? I started asking that question when I was, like, ten. So, I know. It’s frustrating. And we can get into why the Markers around the State are the way they are, but that’s for another conversation.
The miners underground were not the only ones injured or killed by the disaster. The above ground workers within certain proximity of the mines were also injured or killed by the force of the disaster. There were also people on the west side of town who were injured in their homes or on the streets by the seismic shock of the blasts from the mines beneath them. There were expecting mothers all over town who would suffer premature labor; some did not survive it, some did. Though they are all a part of the collateral damage, they too must be considered “survivors” of the disaster.
So, for the purpose of this post and the information it aims to provide, “survivor” is going to apply to anyone who was physically injured or impacted by being within certain proximity of the mines, be it inside or outside, at the time of the explosions and lived for many more years after.
I am going to discuss some these survivors briefly by dividing them into 2 groups: those who were “Underground” inside the mines at the time and those who were outside “Aboveground”. As you would be right to assume, there are fewer people in the “Underground” category, so let’s start there.
Underground Survivors
Orazio “Crazic” DePetris – crawled out of #8 through a toad hole with 3 other men; will lose his 19-year-old son, Felix, in the disaster; Brother of Angelo DePetris; suffered minor physical injuries.
Angelo “Orizio” DePetris – crawled out of #8 through a toad hole with 3 other men; Brother of Orazio DePetris; suffered minor physical injuries.
Leonardo Dominico – crawled out of #8 through a toad hole with 3 other men; grown son of Dan Dominico; suffered minor physical injuries.
Dan Dominico – crawled out of #8 through a toad hole with 3 other men; father of Leo Dominico; injured his shoulder after being thrown down by the blasts inside the mine.
Peter Rosebeig “Urban” – most known survivor, often called the “sole survivor”; was the only one to be *rescued* alive by being pulled out of #8 mine almost six hours after the disaster; will die Oct. 9, 1926 in #8 mine as a result of a roof fall.
Peter Urban, photo used for cover of Goldenseal in 1993
Aboveground Survivors
Hyre “Harry” Stalnaker – carpenter for #6; working at #8 shop across the river from #8 mine that morning; thrown across the carpenter shop by blast concussion and rendered unconscious for some time.
Will Jenkins – blacksmith at #6; trampled by a horse he was shoeing when it was startled by the blasts.
Alonzo Shroyer – carpenter at #6; standing by the portal of #6 mine when explosions happened; blown back by the blast, hit his head, suffered a severe cut to the bone behind his ear along with other injures.
J.H Leonard – fan operator for #6; knocked down and bruised up by the concussion; head and scalp covered in some sort of substance from the mine which adhered and would not wash off for over a month.
Pat McDonald – working at the #6 trestle; blown back over 100 feet onto the haulage bridge by the explosion and badly burnt; taken to hospital on same interurban car as Joe Newton; released from hospital by mid-December; does not testify at the Coroner’s Inquiry
Joe Newton – fan operator at #8; seen right after the disaster by Stalnaker; severe head injuries including globe luxation; taken to hospital on the same interurban car as Pat McDonald; appears in the earliest lists the dead but is not on any final lists of the dead; possibly still in hospital during the inquiry.
I have not included those who were injured and merely survived the initial event, like William Bice or Stan Urban, as they would still die as a result of their injuries soon after the disaster. Below is a contemporary image of a miner standing outside one of the mines with a Wolf Safety Lamp attached to his waist. The image is etched with, “A Survivor of the Monongah Horror”. However, the actual identity of the man in the photograph is not known.
Recommended by Author
Many songs have been written and recorded about the Monongah Disaster. But very few come close to AJ Lee’s “Monongah Mine”. Of all the survivors listed above, one thing is clear: no one returned from mine number 6.
Both mines were located on the west side of the West Fork River in Monongah. Each mine portal generally lines up the end of town limits north and south. Large trestles connected them to their tipples, breakers, and other such resources which were on the east side of the West Fork River.
How accessible are the two mines and their portals today?
Both mines are closed off, and the land has been allowed to grow over but the general main portal locations are “reachable”.
#6 portal is *technically* on county owned public access property. However, it is not recommended anyone go out there for any reason beyond absolute need. The entire area has been allowed to overgrow to reinforce the stability of the watershed and the west side bluff that supports the residential town directly above. This little stretch of town is only accessed with vehicles by the local power companies or other municipalities in order to maintain the power lines which have run along that portion of land since the days of the interurban streetcar. Should you decide to hike out there by foot, which is truly your best choice, a few words of caution:
Remember, you are in the Monongahela Valley. “Monongahela” can be roughly interpreted as “a place where the land is ancient; there are deep valleys surrounded by high bluffs and hillsides which will fall out from underneath of you or will fall down on top of you. And snakes! LOTS of snakes.”
There are many spots along this path which are not as stable as they may seem or feel under your feet. Plan each step before you take it. Stick to the tire tracks where the utility vehicles have last been as best as you can.
Tread with extreme caution and constant mindfulness of your full surroundings and always have an external light source with you, no matter the time of day. Have a way to call or signal for help should an emergency arise.
Wear long pants, long sleeves and cover your hair to prevent ticks and other insects from latching onto your skin. Use bug sprays/repellants for “deep woods” conditions.
Wear good quality hiking boots preferably steel-toed and snakebite proof if you are not used to or familiar with this space. A good sturdy hiking stick is also recommended.
Have a snakebite kit with you. I mentioned snakes, right? LOTS of snakes? Yeah, this particular area is a known “snake den” and was even in 1907. All of the mines in town kept snakebite kits at the portals but the area where #6 portal is located has always been a favorite location for nests.
Do not harm the snakes, their dens, or their nests. That is their home. Not yours. If they don’t want you there, just leave. Try again some other time.
To get an idea of what it means to “hike” out to #6, watch the video below to see my old Monongah classmate do so back in 2025.
For finding #6 the clean way, your best option is to go to the middle of the bridge in the center of town and just look north. The pylon is visible just around the bend in the middle of the West Fork River. It is likely surrounded by random timber debris at its base which is the easiest thing to spot. Find that and then play a simple game of *connect the imaginary dots* to the west side watershed/tree line where #6 portal rests. And, well, that’s it! With the naked eye, at least.
The best way, truly, to get a scope of #6 is via satellite imaging. As mentioned above, the west side of the river where the portal is located is not the greatest place to go if you aren’t down for a dirty hike. The east side of the river where the #6 tipple, powerhouse, offices and other workings were located is now private commercial business property all the way down to the riverside. The Rail Trail foot & bike path running north right between this commercial space and the baseball fields is your best vantage point from the east side.
Old #8 portal is along a portion of the old interurban line which is now an unpaved road on the west side of the river called “Lower Traction Ave.” or “W 63 Mine Rd.”. It is mostly residential and there is not much space for vehicles to park or turn around anywhere along the way. However, the people who live along this road are very generous and do not mind foot or bicycle traffic to and from the mine portal. Just, please, be considerate of their properties, their privacy, and their roads should you visit.
On each side of the West Fork River, running south, are old dirt roads which are both *technically* named “63 Mine Rd.” #8 mine was renamed #63 mine some decades after the disaster and the infrastructure which remains on land is all from post-disaster era or was constructed during “the ’63’ days”.
The key to finding either mine on a map or with your own eye is looking for the pylons from their old trestles which sit right in the center of the West Fork River. Line up with those and you line up with the mine they serviced. #8 is the only one that permits this double vantage today.
The pylons are the only onsite remnants of the disaster which remain today. Anything else associated with mining or its infrastructure came afterwards at different points over the following 60 or so years.
There’s been a misunderstanding about the purpose of the Coroner’s Inquiry and its resulting verdict since it occurred in January of 1908. Many seem to think it was a civil or criminal trial attempting to determine or exonerate blame. Possibly because a jury was involved or because it was held in a proper courtroom with the gallery open to the public, or because it was overseen by a Justice of the Peace who overheard sworn witness testimonies. Maybe it’s because big public coroner’s inquiries just aren’t that common as they used to be, particularly here in the U.S. Probably all of the above.
Though inquiries use a lot of the same legal structure and terminology which are fundamental to civil/criminal trials, they are distinctively different types of formal hearings with different goals. Luckily, very little has changed about how and why these inquests are conducted, other than their frequency.
A Coroner’s Inquiry is a public hearing of evidence which happens when a death (or the deaths of many) seems violent, mysterious, or unnatural somehow. Unlike a criminal or civil trial – which those of the United States will be more familiar with today – a Coroner’s Inquiry is not held to determine if there is any legal liability to be held by anyone. It has just one purpose: attempt to determine who died, where & when the death occurred, and what was the means by which they died. More often than not, this is done to collect evidence and knowledge which can be used to prevent similar deaths in the future.
In the case of the Monongah Mine Disaster, the elected County Coroner was a man by the name of E.S. Amos who had personally organized, set up and ran the makeshift morgue in Monongah within the first 15 or so hours after the disaster and laid out the protocol for how bodies would be managed, documented, and treated as they came through the morgue over the next several weeks. Amos is the one who would establish and uphold what is known as the “official number” of dead for Monongah – the number of deceased individuals which came through the coroner’s morgue in association with the mine disaster.
Coroner Amos, whose surname is biblically associated with the concept of ‘speaking with God’s righteous justice against the disparities of the rich and the poor’, also happened to be the elected “Justice of the Peace” in 1907 and was a known political associate of A.B Fleming. This is likely what fueled the suspicion and confusion of Amos and his role in this hearing then and still does to this day. However, thoroughly reading through the transcript of this lengthy inquiry clearly shows that when it came to this case and its resulting verdict, his duties sat first and solely as the Coroner – an elected steward of death – who handled almost all of these victims himself over the course of several weeks, not as a representative of some form of “righteous” Justice aiming to bring peace.
Comprehending the verdict of the Jury at the Coroner’s Inquiry
The majority of these inquests require only the coroner and their singular verdict. However, any mysterious/unnatural/violent deaths in the workplace in the State not only required a Coroner’s Inquiry in 1907 but they also required a jury, consisting of 6 “disinterested” local men in this case, to tackle large calamities like mining disasters.
Again, the jury’s duty in this inquest was not for the purpose of assigning blame or placing liability on any entity for the deaths of the miners at Monongah. They were there to collect the evidence as it was presented, to analyze and summarize it, and come to at least a two-thirds majority agreement on a “most likely case” scenario then use said scenario as a basis to recommend any changes in general work practices or existing laws which could aid in preventing other such loss of life in the future.
Now, recalling that the jury is there to answer these basic questions:
Who died?
Where did they die?
When did they die?
What was the primary means/cause of death?
let’s review their verdict. Here are the portions which matter most, in full:
The jurors sworn to inquire when, how and by what means the said A. H. Morris, Charlie McCane, John M. McGraw and about three hundred and fifty other persons came to their death, upon their oaths do say that we find from the evidence in our possession that A. H. Morris, Charlie McCane, John M. McGraw and about three hundred and fifty (350) others, whose names are made a part of the record herein, came to their death on the 6th day of December, 1907, by means of an explosion in Monongah Mines numbered six and eight owned or operated by the Fairmont Coal Company, which was caused by either what is commonly known as a blown-out shot, or by the igniting and explosion of powder in Mine Number Eight. As to which caused the initial explosion, the evidence and opinion of mine experts, and other witnesses, was conflicting.
We further find from the evidence that the traces of gas in these mines were slight, and not considered dangerous, and dust which was created was removed or kept watered down as far as was deemed practicable, and that in operating these mines the Company complied with the mining laws of the State. (Report of Hearings… – pg 489 – 490)
Let’s simplify that first part a bit: “The jurors sworn to inquire when, how and by what means the said…persons came to their death…do say that we find from the evidence in our possession…came to their death on the 6th day of December, 1907, by means of an explosion in Monongah mines numbered six and eight…”. That’s it. Really, that’s the formal “verdict” as those are the factual answers to those 4 fundamental questions the jury was required to formally answer.
Additionally, in these major workplace related disasters, the jury had a duty to theorize as best as they could any and all potential, possible, or probable scenarios which could have occurred and to offer recommendations on how they could possibly be prevented in the future. To do so, the jurors have chosen to present the causes, conditions, and factors which had the highest tally of consensus among the sworn witnesses while still including that these witnesses did not come to any formal conclusions, only several sound theories. Therefore, the rest is all chosen and presented as justified speculation for the purpose of theorizing various ways to potentially prevent such losses again in the future.
Their choice to include their further findings from the evidence reflects that the majority of the witnesses conceded to these things as well. It’s not a statement which exonerates the company, the miners, or the conditions of the mines. It’s acknowledgement that, in spite of all these things which were done properly and to the extent of their knowledge, this event was still able to occur and cause such devastating loss of life.
Many youths were lost in this disaster, as they were in most every type of industrial disaster around this point in time. That is unmistakable and absolute. “Tombstones don’t lie,” as the saying goes. Even the ones only big enough to bear the year “1907”.
The youths of Monongah mines #6 & #8 have always been a topic that just overflows with misinformation. This is mostly due to the Darr mine disaster occurring so close in proximity to the Monongah disaster, the two events having so many similarities, and much of the information about each separate event having gotten mix-matched with each other right from the start or blended with other disasters over time. We can certainly relate since it’s very similar to keeping the numerous school shooting events and their details organized in our collective memories over the last 25+ years.
Fairmont West Virginian Dec. 7, 1907, pg 1
Again, in regard to the question of exact numbers of youth lives lost in mines #6 & #8, the best answer we truly have is:
Unknown/Undetermined
“Unknown/Undetermined” is used to answer this question so as to never presume or dismiss any potential future information which could come along; to never forget that we truly never “knew”, still don’t “know”, and likely never will. However, a general minimum estimate can be provided.
The coroner’s records list 50 victims who were able to be identified and are listed as minors, aged 14 – 21 years old.
In 1907, a “minor” (aka “child”) was anyone under the age of 21 across the majority of the country. At 16, military or militia service could be performed without parental consent. At 14, one was eligible to be held liable for crimes, apprentice in workplaces and testify in court without parental consent or intervention. At 12 years of age, in some cases, the minor could be eligible to inherit, own, and run private estates.
A brief review of the laws
As there will be other posts more focused on the mining laws and liabilities, a quick summary of just the laws regarding minors should be enough to get the points across. To review the mining laws in full you can click on the image below. To view the mining laws only regarding to the “Employment of Children”, go to page 2 of this post.
Amendment passed to mining laws in February of 1907
In 1905, no minor, male or female, under the age of 12 was permitted to work inside the mine. In February of 1907, the law was changed to permit onlymales aged 14 years and older inside the mine as well as requiring notarized affidavits “in all cases of doubt” of the minor’s age.
Mine foremen and operators were the ones legally responsible and accountable for seeing that all laws regarding minors were strictly followed.
Penalties for violations in 1905 were simple fines. In 1907, the fines got significantly higher and jailtime became a possibility for any offenders. All fines paid were put to the county common school fund.
There were also the public’s “Common Sense/Common Law” traditions of the time which were rooted in the standards and traditions of the agricultural/farming work which pre-dated the Industrial Era. These were not formal written “laws” which were applied on a State or Federal level. They were how upbringing and livelihoods had been “traditionally” managed by individual families or communities for centuries prior to the Industrial Era. Therefore, what was “Common Sense/Common Law” was frequently entirely subjective to the parent/guardian based upon their own upbringing as minors.
The agricultural traditions generally acknowledged 8 years of age to be eligible for “entry-level” work meaning one was mentally, physically, and intellectually capable of performing certain important tasks on their own. A person of 8 years old could, on average, be entrusted with feeding the smaller domesticated animals, taking something to a person or location and returning safely with the correct items, or helping with general domestic/property work without guidance or supervision from someone older.
What were their jobs?
Those 8 years and older could legally work as “breakers” in Monongah since the breakers were above ground just beneath the tipple on the east side of the West Fork River and this work did not count as minors being “in” a “mine, factory, workshop, mercantile or manufacturing establishment where goods or wares are made or sold”. One could easily argue then & now that their portion of “cleaning” certain impurities out of the coal by hand was a type of “manufacturing”, but they still didn’t “make” the coal they cleaned nor was this “where” said coal was “sold“. The breakers received and processed the raw product to make it ready to be sent to the market for sale. This work was not solely occupied by “entry-level” minors, however. Breakers also employed seniors and disabled people, particularly if they had already worked in the mines but had come to a point where they could no longer physically do the work required underground.
Around 10-13 years old, a minor with the physical strength and stamina could become a “bit-boy” carrying large replacement drill bits in and out of the mine. Much like the blacksmiths & carpenters, his work was primarily based above ground with the occasional need to go into the mines, get to his destination, exchange the fresh bits for dulled ones, then get back above ground as quickly as possible. They were employed through the company and were on the formal payroll roster. According to Davitt McAteer’s research, bit-boys earned a flat rate of 85 cents per day. It is likely that at least a few of the remains found underground which could not be identified were bit-boys who happened to be in the mines at the time of the explosion.
Drill bits used in the mines
“Trappers” were minors aged between 11ish-15ish, depending on when & where they were hired. They were fully underground workers responsible for opening and closing large doors which ventilated the mine and allowed miners & cars of coal to pass through. Trappers were also on the formal payroll roster and earned a flat rate of 85 cents a day according to McAteer. Prior to 1907, 12 years of age was deemed legally acceptable for this job, but the new amendments approved by Gov. Dawson pushed the age to 14 for anyone “in” the coal mine. It’s likely those still only 12-13 years old at the time the amendment went into effect were permitted to stay in their trapper positions and were not required to go back to jobs which held aboveground status with similar pay, like bit-boy.
As far as is known, FCC employed at least one trapper per operating door in their mines unlike others in the State which often made them responsible for multiple doors along one section. What is not formally known, to this author at least, is how many of these doors were present and in operation in each of the mines at the time of the disaster.
Trappers were typically the youngest of the minors hired through the coal company who worked completely underground at the time of the disaster. The number of trappers put on each door was completely dependent on the company, the layout of the mine, and the minor’s physical ability to move the door. They sat sometimes for hours on end, often alone and with little more lighting than the headlamp provided, waiting for the need to unlatch, hold open, and then close the door. As simple as it sounds, their job was utterly critical to the containment and dilution of any marsh gases in the mines.
As one might imagine when it comes to preteens who are idled for too long, trappers had a reputation for mischief or just getting blamed for certain mishaps in the mines back then just as much as they do today in school, church, etc. They were not immune from injury in their job positions, particularly if they were not very careful even when messing about.
Fairmont West Virginian Saturday, October 5, 1907 – page 1
“Leaders” & “Drivers” were minors typically 15 years of age or older. They worked directly with the mules or horses which hauled cars of coal or other heavy materials in and out of the mines. The animals were often blind (for several potential reasons) and required physical guidance through the mine, particularly through the ventilation doorways. Leaders were typically the younger minors, likely just moved up from Trapper, who walked ahead of or along the side of the team using the reigns to lead the team safely through the path ahead. Drivers were the minors with more experience in this job and walked behind the team of animals. They steered the team and the load being hauled with a separate set of reigns and often an additional chain attached to the driver’s leg for the blind teams. According to McAteer, they were “paid by the run at 12 cents an hour”. Typically, both positions were often referred to under the general title of “drivers” by the company’s payroll roster.
Contractor work with fathers/brothers/etc. was the most likely way a minor could end up “left off the books” in situations like these. According to several testimonies of mine inspectors, foremen, and superintendents from across the state to the West Virginia Legislative Committee between 1907 – 1909ish, these youths were the most likely to have falsified documents or to have the obvious fact that they were underage “intentionally overlooked” as a favor or even a sign of compassion to an adult miner. However, though the “common” knowledge of contractor work at the time goes along the lines of, “every adult miner brought their boy/son into the mines with them to help”, it is critical to know that very many of these “boys” and “sons” were, more often than not, fully legal-aged adults in their own right already. Of the 50 minors which could be identified, more than 30 of them were 18 or older.
In these situations, these minors would not be included on the “official” payroll or employee roster, unlike the other jobs for minors listed above. However, they would have still been noted in the general roster made by the underground day foremen of both mines. These attendance roster sheets of underground workers were taken over the course of the first few hours of the workday and typically submitted into the main offices across the river around 11-11:30am once all work had been assigned and was well underway. Just like our teachers used to do for class attendance in school. Unfortunately, with the explosions occurring around 10:30am, recorded evidence of anyone who was working in a contractor’s position that morning was destroyed in the disaster.
The Unidentified
According to the Marion County Coroner’s Report, which includes the morgue and cemetery records, there are possibly 4 more victims which may have been minors based on certain descriptions or remarks made in the documents.
#32 – unknown young man – nothing to identify him – grave #7 – remark “found around the 1st right pillar”
“young” is not a commonly used descriptor through the documents
#85 – Polish boy – grave #21 Polish side – remark “House 120”
This is the only use of “boy” to describe a victim. There is mention at the Inquiry by George Gibbons of a Polish boy who was believed to have gone into the mine without a record taken.
#156 – unknown – grave #15 row A – remark “Trapper. E Face – Heading 2nd st. No 6 mine”
This is the only victim to go unidentified but still acknowledged as likely having been a trapper.
#322- unknown – not opened as per instructions – remark “Special lot in new cemetery”
This “special lot in the new cemetery” was likely one of the available plots around the large tree at the top of the hill along the dividing line of the cemetery. The oral history of town says there was, at first, high demand for these few lots which were to be placed under the only shade-giving tree in the cemetery, but it was soon decided that those prime spots should go to the unidentifiable youths which could not be matched to their family members.
Recommended by Author
For more on “Common Sense/Common Law” regarding child work/labor and early labor organizing around the UK (which Mother Jones and other union organizers used here in the U.S. to encourage unionization, particularly in Monongah in 1902), I highly recommend the BBC series “The Mill” from 2013-2014. The show is based on true stories that happened to real people in a textile mill in England in the 1830s.
Below is a short clip from Season 2 Episode 1. It’s purpose here is purely for education and general insight on “Common Sense/Common Law” traditions and how they had been applied to minors for generations.
You can watch this full episode and several others on YouTube or other free sites
Marion County Coroner’s Report – E.S. Amos Marion County Coroner, Dec. 1907 – Jan 1908 (Available at County Clerk’s Office in the Marion County Courthouse in Fairmont, WV)
This is, quite frankly, one of those “For the Ages” questions. Though dust certainly contributed to spreading the initial destructive force throughout both mines and afterdamp was the primary culprit for the majority of deaths underground, the *cause* – what ignited or fueled that initial force – has never been formally determined or declared. Therefore, the best we can get to an actual *answer* on that question will most certainly always be:
Undetermined/Inconclusive
That’s it.
“Undetermined/Inconclusive” is used to answer this question just as it is with so many others associated with this event so as to never presume or dismiss any potential future information which could come along; to never forget that we truly never “knew”, still don’t “know”, and likely never will.
Following any major incident, investigations and reports made by numerous inspectors were required by law. They did do their best with their individual and collective experience. Their varied theories are a testament to their objective analyses. Their collective insistence that the educated theories they presented were the best they could objectively & consciously attend to also support that fact. The findings which they presented were their “best educated guesses” as it were, not absolute certainties. Nor did they present them as such.
There was no formal consensus of ideas or theories as to the cause of the disaster among those who investigated the mines afterwards and then went on to testify to the jury at the Inquiry. These inspectors will make individual investigations and reports on the disaster. They will also collaborate in writing & submitting a joint report on the disaster.
The joint report of inspectors which was submitted to the mine department as well as to the jury during the Inquiry read: “…we do think this explosion was caused from coal dust.” and, “We are of the opinion that the trip of loaded cars which broke away and ran down the slope was merely a coincident with the explosion and bore no relation to the explosion….”.
However, several of the inspectors who signed it as being in unanimous agreement with these findings would also testify that they, in fact, did not agree. They testify that were not forced or coerced in any way to go along with any predetermined narrative or any one theory, but they do stand by findings from the joint report as much as their own because they are conflicting. Acknowledging both the joint report and their individual reports was a way to double-down on these many factors and variables which ultimately left them in such “inconclusive” territory.
These factors and variables in their reports differed so widely that the only universal, absolute conclusion anyone could make was that Monongah mines #6 & #8 experienced destruction, force, and devastation the likes none of them had ever seen before nor had even considered possible for “model mines” such as these.
The two mines were connected along one heading. In mine #6 this heading was called “F face”. The #8 mine had a collection of names for its side of this same heading: “No. 8 North Heading”, “2nd North Heading”, and/or “2nd Right Heading”.
Inspector LaRue describes in a report about the disaster to the mine department that the two mines are “connected near their centers by three small openings, each covering the area of 70 feet”, along a singular heading.
L.E. Trader, fire boss for #6, describes in his testimony how two of these openings were fitted out. In the “entry farthest from the river” (highlighted in light blue and marked “1” in the image above), a wooden stopping was placed about 15′ beyond 4th right on F face to close the connection.
In the entry closest to the river (highlighted in light green and marked “3”), was a thick wooden door which opened towards #6 at the time of the disaster. Unlike the center entry which he could not describe, Trader had been through this doorway entry on F face and could confirm that it had at one point been blocked by a pair of double iron gates which men could still move through & past. But Trader said that once the thick doors were put in place, the iron gates were removed and the doors remained, “locked with a chain—locked on No. 8 side and on our side. The chain passed through a hole about a foot from the edge of the door—two feet long.”
In these connecting headings there were doors so that each mine was separately ventilated at the time of the accident, the object of connecting them being the ability to ventilate each mine from either opening in case of necessity. It has been shown that this was entirely practicable as this method of ventilation has been carried on at various times when either of the fans was undergoing repairs, and was the temporary method used during the going repairs, and was the temporary method used during the investigation following the explosion owing to the destruction of one of the fans… – Mines and Minerals Vol. 28, pg 278
Was this illegal or irresponsible at the time?
No.
Connected mines were legal and strictly regulated by the mine department to the point that the mine department could even order a company to connect to another mine or face penalty. Several mines around the state were in the process of connecting to other existing mines when disaster fell upon them earlier in the year.
There were several reasons why two mines, particularly those known to be gaseous (which #6 & #8 were not), would want to be or were required to be connected underground. The first critical reason was a mining method called “Double (Triple) Entry”. This method had been made formal law in West Virginia some years prior to the disaster as it permitted more ventilation through the mines and required at least 2 entry points for workers to get in and out of a mine. This is certainly why when C.W. Watson was questioned right after the disaster about the reason for having the mines connected, he simply replied to the reporters that it was “for the purpose of giving more openings.”
Connected workings underground also made large machine repairs more efficient and could be used in emergencies as an added “escape route” for workers in the deepest parts of the mines. This is quite likely why #8 mine boss, John McGraw, was found several days after the disaster deceased on the #6 side just beyond this connection. His remains were able to be identified by friends as well as by the contents of his pockets indicating that he likely survived the initial blasts and was trying to escape into #6 mine when the damps eventually overtook him.
For mines over a certain size, or shaft mines which require miners to take them underground, or the mines formally classified as “highly gaseous” connection to another mine to provide extra ventilation and access for workers was the standard method long before 1907.
The two mines were *connected* along one heading, yes. But shared ventilation? As in: one fan and one big open continuous system for both mines?
No.
Mine #6 was the elder mine, opening in October of 1899. It had its own ventilation system and an 8′ x 11′ Capell fan for years before #8 came along.
Mine #8 had an independent system from its start in 1904 along with a much larger 22′ x 8′ Ripley fan.
Both mines had designated airways for ventilation of “bad air” as well as “good air” ventilation for the working areas and haul ways. The two systems were connected along one heading for several practical reasons, including the ability to be “shared” should it become necessary. This heading was called “F Face” in #6 mine and “No. 8 North Face” in #8 mine.
Evidence for these separate systems has always been in plain sight in contemporary photos and reports. But perhaps like some of the first outside reporters on the scene back in 1907, most are just not familiar with these types of workings in this type of place and get a little confused by what they see or read.
Perfectly understandable. Let’s try to remedy that by getting everybody a little more oriented.
#6 Mine
Below is a “bird’s eye” ground plan of #6 mine entry in 1907. You can see the #6 fan house to the left of the portal and trestle. It is connected to the dedicated airways which take “good air” in for the workers as well as vent out the “bad air” from the workings.
Below is a picture taken likely within the first 48 hours of the disaster. Using the ground plan above, locate the green arrow indicating the location of #6 portal. If you were standing around the tip of that green arrow and looked in the direction which the arrow points, the image below is what you would have seen in 1907.
Let’s try that again, but from another perspective. Using the same map above, locate the orange arrow indicating #6 trestle. If you were standing at the tip of that orange arrow on that section of the #6 trestle and looked towards the #6 portal, the image below is what you would have seen within a few hours after the disaster in 1907.
Practically no damage was done to the entrance of No. 6 mine, and there is very little evidence on the surface to indicate an underground disaster. The top of the air-shaft to which the No. 6 fan was connected was blown in the air, but no damage was done to the fan or engine. Thirty-four minutes after the explosion, this door had been repaired and fan was in regular operation. – Mines and Minerals, Vol. 28, pg 279
#8 Mine
Below is another “bird’s eye” ground plan, this time of #8 mine entry. Unfortunately, most every available copy of a ground plan for this mine has the location of the fan and boiler houses either covered or missing due to low quality copies. This map is from Mines and Minerals Vol. 28 and though it is a ground plan from around a year prior to the disaster, it is the only one which does not cover the location of the fan and boiler houses with the title “No. 8 Mine”.
Just like we did above with #6, locate the red arrow that indicates the #8 Fan & Boiler Houses on the map of #8 above. If you were standing at the tip of that red arrow, looking in the direction which the arrow points, the image below is what you would have seen a few hours after the disaster in 1907. Note the missing fan plates on the top left side of #8 fan.
One last time, here is another perspective. On the map above, locate the orange arrow which indicates the #8 trestle and the green arrow pointing at the #8 portal. If you were standing on the #8 trestle near the tip of the orange arrow and looked in the direction of the #8 portal, this “enhanced” wide shot from Mines and Minerals Vol. 28 is the overwhelming view you would have had that day.
The No. 8 slope and manway were completely wrecked at the mouth…The 22’x8′ steel fan with steel casings and concrete roof was completely wrecked…Part of one of the fan plates was blown across the river.” – Mines and Minerals, Vol. 28, pg 278-279
Hopefully you are a little more mentally and visually familiar with 2 separate mines now. And that they very clearly each had their own independent fans and ventilation systems from the start which were more than adequate for the spaces they served.
